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Patton: The Texas Rule of Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land for I

'PREMISES LIABILITY-THE TEXAS RULE OF LIABILITY OF
OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND FOR INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY BUSINESS INVITEES ON THE
PREMISES-REVISITED AND
RECONSIDERED
LARRY R. PATTON
Reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is nothing else
but reason .

. .

. The law, which is perfection of reason.1

Sir Edward Coke
Liability for negligent conduct ordinarily is based upon a failure to exercise reasonable care in the conduct of one's activities. 2 Premises liability,
the liability of the owner or occupier 3 of land for injuries sustained by persons entering upon the land from defects or dangerous conditions thereon,
has not followed this general rule. The applicable rule instead has been
predicated upon a measuring of the extent and scope of the owner or occupier's duty which is established according to the status of the entrant at the
time of his injury. 4 Thus, differing standards of liability have been imposed,
depending upon whether the entrant is a trespasser, a licensee, or a business invitee. 5 The business invitee has enjoyed a special status because his
entrance upon the premises has been considered an economic benefit to the
landowner, or alternatively, because of implied representations of safety inherent in holding land open to the public.6
Recent decisions reflect a trend toward the abolition of the common law
distinctions that have been made between the business invitee and other
1.

INSTITUTES: COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, FIRST INSTITUTE § 138 (1628).
2. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 145 (4th ed. 1971);

OF TORTS § 282, 283 (1965); 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.1,
at 1430 (1956).
3. Premises liability ordinarily refers to the liability of the owner or occupier to
all parties entering upon the premises. In this comment the term premises liability
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

is used to refer to that portion of the law which refers to the duties owed by the

landowner or occupier to the business invitee.
The terms owner and occupier are used interchangeably throughout this comment.
When one or the other is found singularly, it may be considered an application of the
facts to a particular party's control of the premises.

4. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, -

U.S. -

(1973); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 230 (1971).

5. See 40 Tax.

JUR. 2d Negligence §§ 55-76 (1962);
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 57-64, at 351-415 (4th ed. 1971).
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF

§ 61, at 386, 389 (4th ed.

1971).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 4, Art. 7

1974]

COMMENTS

entrants who have been accorded a lesser status. 7 Contemporary courts
and legislatures also have carved away many of the doctrines which have
developed around the principles of negligence,8 and have adopted comparative negligence 9 as an alternative method of establishing liability. In premises liability, the modern trend is to base recovery of damages "according to
the standard of reasonable care under all the circumstances,"' 1 notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff may be a trespasser upon the defendant's
land. Thus, the current approach is to view premises liability according
to the precepts which traditionally have applied exclusively to the business
invitee.
In light of the persuasive arguments in favor of change in the basic approach to premises liability that have been propounded in other jurisdictions and the inclination of the Supreme Court of Texas to alter traditional

tort concepts when the reasons for their existence no longer seem determinative," questions concerning the need for modification of the Texas rule
of premises liability are significant. The following discussion attempts to
place the Texas rule of liability for injuries sustained by business invitees
in developmental perspective. The objective sought is a reconsideration of
the legal principles within the dictates of the ultimate common law testthe test of reason.
7. E.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
cenied, - U.S. - (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. City & County, 452 P.2d
445 (Hawaii 1969); see Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 230 (1971).
8. The following states have either abolished assumption of the risk or severely
limited its application: Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 68 (Alas. 1968); Parker v.
Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967); Feigner v. Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136, 15354 (Mich. 1965); Bolduc v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641, 644 (N.H. 1962); McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 239-40 (N.J. 1963); Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d
1147, 1152 (N.M. 1971); Ritter v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080 (Ore. 1961); Siragusa v.
Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767, 774 (Wash. 1962).
9. The first state to adopt a comparative negligence statute was Mississippi in
1910, Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1943).
Other jurisdictions include e.g., Wisconsin
(1913); Nebraska (1913); South Dakota (1941); Arkansas (1957); Maine (1964); and
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Vermont (allin 1969). For
a complete listing of the state statutes involving comparative negligence, see Fisher,
Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 657 n.11 (1973-74). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67, at 436 (4th ed. 1971).
The Texas Comparative Negligence Statute, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Supp. 1974), discussed infra, became effective September 1, 1973.
10. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1973).
11. See Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Sup. 1973) (recognition of
right of privacy), noted in 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 345 (1973); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff,
473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Sup. 1971) (altering parental immunity doctrine); Comment, The
Balance Between Individual Rights and Family Preservation: The Future of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 48 (1972); Howle v. Camp
Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
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THE TEXAS RULE OF PREMISES LIABILITY

Premises liability is most easily understood as the progeny of a legal
system which recognizes the preeminence of property rights. The common
law pragmatically recognized a need for differing standards of liability "in
view of the sparseness of land settlements, and the inability of owners to
inspect or maintain distant holdings." 12 Thus, emphasis was placed "on the
economic and social importance of free use and exploitation of land over
and above the personal safety"' 13 of those who might enter upon the land.
This value system seems to have been particularly acceptable to the inhabitants of Texas; decisions dating back to 1883 disposed of premises liability
cases on the principles of assumption of the risk, or volenti non fit injuria, as
14
absolute defenses to liability.
The Texas rule of premises liability was established early. In Peck v.
Peck,' 5 a master-servant action, the supreme court stated that the invitee had
a right to rely on the master providing a safe place for work and only under
limited circumstances was this duty of the master as landowner or occupier
discharged.' 6 The principles set forth in the Peck decision still control in
questions of premises liability to business invitees in Texas. The basic rule
entrenched in our common law heritage is that the landowner is not an insurer,' 7 but he must provide a safe place for his invitees to enter upon for
the transaction of business.' 8 The landowner has an affirmative duty to inspect for defects,' 9 and must repair or take measures to repair the defects,
or must adequately warn the invitee of all dangerous conditions which are
not open and obvious.20 Because the landowner is not an insurer, the true
basis of liability is superior knowledge of the defect. 21 Dangerous condi12. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc. 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, -

U.S. -

(1973).

13. Id. at 101.
14. E.g., McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883) wherein it was stated: "As a general principle, a man can recover no damages for an injury received at the hands of
another, with his own consent, unless it arises from some act which is in itself a breach
of the peace."
15. 99 Tex. 10, 87 S.W. 248 (1905).
16. Id. at 14, 87 S.W. at 249.
17. In Franklin V. City of Galveston, 256 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) it was stated:
It is well established in this and many other jurisdictions that the mere ownership
of lands or buildings does not render the owner liable for injuries that may be sustained by those who enter thereon. He is not an insurer of such persons even
though he invites them to enter his premises.
Id. at 1000, quoting Forth Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Hambright, 130 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
18. E.g., Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 464, 226 S.W.2d 425, 431 (1950).
19. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Howell, 117 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1938, writ dism'd).
20. E.g., Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
21. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1963);
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tions which do not exist at the time the invitee enters the premises, but
which arise through the invitee's activities,
are not ordinarily such defects
22
for which the landowner is held liable.
Notwithstanding the extreme simplicity of the legal principles, application of these rules to a given factual situation historically has proven difficult. Robert E. McKee, Gen. Contractor,Inc. v. Patterson2 3 perhaps best exemplifies the confusion which has characterized questions of premises liability. The plaintiff sought redress for injuries sustained in a fall from a
ladder placed on a highly polished gymnasium floor. The essential question
on appeal concerned the duty owed to employees of subcontractors; the
court easily clarified the applicable principles:
There are two legal theories, wholly aside from the plaintiff's own
negligence, for denying liability in a suit against an owner or occupier
of land brought by an invitee for injuries growing out of open and obvious dangers thereon. One rests on the judicial concept that there is
no breach of any duty the landowner owes to his invitees. The other
arises out of the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria-voluntary encountering24of the risk-which is regarded as a defense to all negligence actions.

In contrast to this simple predicate, the court's application of the rules
has led to confusion. In deciding the case upon a theory of voluntary exposure to risk, the court did not reach the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, 25 but it did delimit the applicable test for ascertaining
the discharge of the owner or occupier's duty to the business invitee:
It is now well established in this state that the duty [of the owner or
occupier] does not extend to those invitees who know or should know
of the existence of the particular
condition and who appreciate or
2 6
should appreciate its dangers.

At best, the court's language was an unfortunate mixture of two distinct
concepts: fault (should) and consent (know, appreciate). The specific
problem resulted from dicta in which the court asserted that "the defenses of
voluntary exposure to risk and contributory negligence are frequently treated

as one and the same."'27 Treating two defensive measures as "one and
see Keeton, Assumption of the Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 116
(1961) who states:
It must be admitted that there is abundant authority for the proposition that the
true ground upon which the occupier's liability for personal injuries arising from
dangerous conditions on land rests in his superior knowledge of the dangers
thereon. (Emphasis added).
22. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Harris, 436 S.W.2d 408, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th
Cir. 1960); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wright, 236 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1956).
23. 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
24. Id. at 519, 271 S.W.2d at 393.
25. Id. at 525, 271 S.W.2d at 397.
26. Id. at 520-21, 271 S.W.2d 393 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 520, 271 S.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
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the same" might have limited the quantity of issues in a hearing on the
merits; the logical inconsistency, however, is quite apparent. Voluntary
exposure to risk erases the defendant's duty obligations, 2s whereas contributory negligence traditionally has barred recovery in spite of negligence
or breach of duty on the part of the defendant-owner or occupier. 29 The
McKee explanation created a need for revision, but the confusion reigned
for almost a decade.
THE HALEPESKA CLARIFICATION

In Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 30 the court was faced with
a wrongful death action which resulted from a blowout of a gas well owned
by the defendant. The court of civil appeals found no breach of duty to the
deceased because the danger was open and obvious, and Halepeska had
voluntarily exposed himself to a risk of which in the exercise of ordinary
care, he should have known and which he should have appreciated.81 The
propriety of the issues concerning what the deceased should have known
or appreciated, in support of a finding of voluntary exposure to risk, elicited
the attention of the supreme court. In clarifying the applicable rules of law,
the court has made Halepeska the leading case in instances of injury to a
business invitee resulting from defects on the premises.
Premises liability, per Halepeska, is essentially a consideration of three
separate doctrines: (1) "no duty"; (2) volenti non fit injuria; and (3)
contributory negligence. 32 The essential distinction between the three principles is one of the burden of pleading and proof. The "no duty" doctrine
is a negating burden placed upon the invitee. As plaintiff, he must not
only prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the dangerously
defective condition of the premises which presented an unreasonable risk
of harm, "but he must also prove . . . that the occupier owed him a duty

to take reasonable precautions to warn him or protect him from such danger, i.e., the plaintiff must negative 'no duty.' 33 In essence the "no duty"
28. Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. Sup. 1966) wherein it was stated:
If with such knowledge and appreciation, or if after a warning, the plaintiff in the
ordinary case nevertheless proceeds, the duty of the occupier is zero; i.e., the occupier no longer owes any duty to the invitee, and the invitee may not recover because he has assumed the risk.

29. Conduct which would ordinarily be considered contributory negligence may be
justified. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Gascamp, 69 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227 (1888).
30. 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Sup. 1963).

31. Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Halepeska, 349 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1961), rev'd, 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
32. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378-80 (Tex. Sup. 1963).

33. Id. at 378 (court's emphasis). Where the defendant moves for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166-A, the plaintiff does not have to negative
"no duty." In such proceedings, the defendant must proceed with proof that he owes
"no duty" to the plaintiff, or that he has discharged this duty. Guidry v. Neches
Butane Prod. Co., 476 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
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doctrine is a burden upon the plaintiff to show that the danger was not
open and obvious, but rather was latent or hidden. In the latter instance,
there is an affirmative duty placed upon the landowner or occupier to warn
the invitee if the danger on the premises is such that he, being in control
of the premises, knows or should know of such by the exercise of reasonable
care. On the other hand, there is "no duty" to warn one "of things he
already knows, or of dangerous conditions or activities which are so open
and obvious that as a matter of law he will be charged with knowledge and
'34
appreciationthereof."
Volenti non fit injuria, most often referred to as volenti, 35 is an affirmative defense based upon the precept that one may not recover for injuries
sustained "when he voluntarily exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger."' 3 6 In Texas, "the decision to incur the risk must have been
deliberate; made with the knowledge and appreciation of the danger so that
'3 7
it may be said that the person acted as a result of an intelligent choice."
Even where actual knowledge and appreciation is lacking, however, "the
plaintiff may not close his eyes to obvious dangers; and he may not recover
where it is shown that he is in possession of facts from which he would be
legally charged with appreciation of the danger."'38 Contributory negli39
gence is also a defensive burden of pleading and proof.
The basic difference between the concepts of "no duty," volenti and the
theory of contributory negligence is that of justification. 40 The idea of actig as a reasonable man under the circumstances is a significant evidentiary
matter in questions of contributory negligence, but the question of reasonableness, or justification, in the "no duty" and volenti doctrines is not relevant. A further distinction is found in the element of proximate cause;
although vital to the question of contributory negligence, it has no part in
"no duty" and volenti issues. The most significant distinction, however, is
found in the applicable tests:
[T]he test in contributory negligence is generally objective: should
plaintiff, as an ordinary, prudent person, have known by the exercise
34. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. Sup. 1963)
(emphasis added).
35. The elements of Volenti are:

(1) the plaintiff has knowledge of facts constituting a dangerous condition or activity;
(2) he knows the condition or activity is dangerous;
(3) he appreciates the nature or extent of the danger; and
(4) he voluntarily exposes himself to this danger.

J & W Corp. v. Ball, 414 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
36. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. Sup. 1963).

37. Id. at 379.
38. Id. at 379.

39. TEx. R. Crv. P. 94.
40. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
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of ordinary care. The test in "no duty" 41and volenti, however, is subjective: did plaintiff know and appreciate.
The common element shared by the "no duty" and volenti doctrines is that
of knowledge and appreciation of the consequences of the danger, or such
obviousness of danger that the law charges the plaintiff with such knowledge
and appreciation. But the "no duty" principle is specifically limited to the
question of whether the owner or occupier owes the plaintiff a duty; if not,
recovery is defeated. In volenti, however, the duty question is irrelevant;
the liability is established by the existence or absence of voluntary exposure
42
to the known and appreciated risk.
Two notable deficiencies remained after the Halepeska clarification: the
court's refusal to limit the "no duty" cases to static conditions; 43 and the
failure to abolish the distinctions made between volenti and assumption of
risk. 44 Later in the same year, the court did limit the applicability of the
"no duty" doctrine to injuries sustained through activities in which the
"movement is generally rigidly circumscribed and easily predictable. '45
Therefore, the plaintiff's burden of negating "no duty" of the owner or
occupier is now mandatory only where static conditions of open and obvious
danger exist, e.g., holes, pits, etc. 46 The court has also defined the term
"open and obvious," 47 thus simplifying the "no duty" and volenti cases.
The most significant post-Halepeska decision is Adam Dante Corp. v.
Sharpe,48 in which the court reiterated its approval of the Restatement (Sec41. Id. at 379.
42. Id. at 380.
43. Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 28 TEX. B.J. 21, 67 (1965).
44. Id. at 22. Justice Greenhill's prospective comments should be examined:
Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court may come to the point of deliberately wiping the slate clean and attempting to start over. It may entirely abandon the concepts of "no duty," volenti non fit injuria, and assumed risk in favor of simple negligence and contributory negligence; or it may limit the assumed risk doctrine to a
very narrow band of cases.
A question which the Justice raises, but which remains unanswered is whether assumption of risk might be considered fault, thus enabling the court to approach the problem
of premises liability on the strict principles of negligence and contributory negligence.
Id. at 22.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has opted to treat some matters
as contributory negligence despite the fact that the factual considerations would traditionally be treated as assumption of the risk. See Gilson v. Drees Bros., 120 N.W.2d
63, 67 (Wis. 1963).
45. Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
46. Edgar, Voluntary Assumption of Risk in Texas Revisited-A Plea For Its
Abolition, 26 Sw. L.J. 849, 863 (1972).
47. In Massman-Johnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Sup. 1972), the
court explained:
Whether a condition is or is not open and obvious to an invitee is not a question
of fact. The phrase, "open and obvious," is often incorrectly used in such a manner as to suggest that it concerns a separate concept or issue. Its correct use
means that there is no dispute in the evidence concerning the facts which charge
him [the plaintiff] with knowledge and full appreciation of the nature and extent
of the danger, and that those two facts are established as a matter of law.
48. 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
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ond) of Torts position on premises liability for injuries received by business
invitees, 4 9 and also refined the "basic issues for a conventional occupierinvitee case." 50

Adam Dante, however, has even greater value: the court

49. Id. at 454. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) provides:
Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees,
and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail
to protect thmeselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Among the notable critics of the Restatement position are Harper and James. James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE
L.J. 605, 628 (1954); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1494 (1956).

50. Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharp, 493 S.W.2d 452, 455 n.1 (Tex. Sup. 1972) sets
out the conventional issues thusly:
Plaintiff's Issues
(Duty and Breach of Duty)
1. Defendant created or maintained a dangerous condition (stating it) on its
premises. (Objective Test)
2. Defendant knew (or should have known) of the condition. (Objective Test)
3. Plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the condition. (Subjective Test)
4. Plaintiff did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of the danger. (Subjective Test)
5. Negligence in some particular act or omission (failure to inspect, failure to correct, failure to warn, etc.).
6. Proximate cause.
Defendant's Issues
(Volenti)
7. Plaintiff actually knew of the particular condition. (Subjective Test)
8. Plaintiff fully appreciatednature and extent of the danger. (Subjective Test)
9. Plaintiff voluntarily encountered the danger. (Subjective Test)
(Contributory Negligence)
10. Plaintiff was negligent (in some particular, such as failure to keep a proper
lookout, walking too fast, etc.) in encountering the risk.
11. Which was a proximate cause of the injury. (Court's emphasis).
This traditional approach in fact inquired about the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of the dangerous condition three separate times. Id. at 456-57. Acknowledging and condemning this multiple submission of the same issue, Justice Pope refined
the issue submission so as to avoid this problem in future cases as follows:
Plaintiff's Issues
1. Defendant created or maintained a dangerous condition (stating it) on its
premises. (Objective Test)
2. Defendant knew (or should have known) of the condition. (Objective Test)
3. Negligence in some particular act or omission (failure to inspect, failure to
correct, failure to warn, etc.).
4. Proximate cause.
Defendant's Issues
(Assumption of Risk)
5. Did plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk of (stating it)? (Subjective Test)
You are instructed that in order for the plaintiff (naming), to assume the
risk, she must have actually known of the condition which caused her injury
and she also must have actually and fully appreciated the nature and extent
of the danger involved in encountering the condition, and she must have
voluntarily and of her own free will encountered the danger of the condition
causing her injuries, if any.
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abolished the confusing distinction which previously had been made between
assumption of risk and volenti non fit injuria. Acknowledging criticism of
the distinction as "one without a difference," Justice Pope stated:
In the present status of the law we do not limit voluntary assumption
of risk to master-servant and contractual relationships, and we regard
to, as well as another name for, voluntary asvolenti as an extension
sumption of risk.5 '
In the 90 years since Peck v. Peck,52 premises liability in Texas has been
defined and redefined, classified and reclassified. Yet in substance the
precepts established in the Peck decision have not changed substantially.
Before entertaining thoughts of equating the status of trespassers, licensees,
and invitees, our courts would do well to reconsider the rule which presently
determines business invitee controversies.
THE TEXAS RULE OF PREMISES LIABILITY-RECONSIDERED

A reconsideration of the Texas rule of premises liability should be approached from the vantage point of ultimate effect. The pervading question
is one of adequacy: Is the current approach adequate to deal with the demands of a highly sophisticated industrial society? In at least two distinct
situations, the application of the common law in Texas has produced results
which are conclusively contrary to reason: injuries received by employees
of independent contractors working on the premises, and slip and fall injuries sustained in public business establishments.
Injury to Employees of Independent Contractors
When the employee of an independent contractor is injured by a defect
in the premises, recovery may be defeated by the employee's contributory
negligence, the absence of any duty on behalf of the owner to the employee, or a finding that the employee voluntarily assumed the risk. 53 In
(Contributory Negligence)
6. Plaintiff was negligent (in some particular, such as failure to keep a proper
lookout, walking too fast, etc.) in encountering the risk.
7. Which was a proximate cause of the injury.

Id. at 458 n.2. Subsequent to Adam Dante the issue of assumption of risk is, therefore,
limited to a simple issue with suitable definitions and instructions. The defendant will
be allowed to submit special issues which separately inquire about each pleaded act or
omission which allegedly constitutes contributory negligence. Id. at 459. But see
revised Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (Supp. 1973) which allows the court to submit general
charges to the jury. Address by Jack Pope, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Texas,
Amarillo, Texas, September 23, 1973 (this subject of general verdict submission is
discussed by Justice Pope in a forthcoming article to be published in 27 Sw. L.J. (November 1973).
51. Id. at 458.
52. 99 Tex. 10, 87 S.W. 248 (1905).
53. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378-80 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
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considering the owner's duty to repair defects or dangerous conditions, how
is he to meet his obligation, if in the process of repairing he may be held
liable for injuries sustained by the workman? Is an adequate warning to
the contractor or the employee's supervisor sufficient? May the owner
dispense with the possibility of liability by contract with the employer?
Attempted discharge of liability of the owner by warnings of dangerous
conditions on the premises to an independent contractor-employer was disapproved in 1924 by the supreme court. 54 But the rule which required the
owner to personally give notice or warning of danger to the individual employee was not strictly followed; later decisions by the courts of civil appeals5 5
and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held to the contrary. 56 Forty
years later, in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry,5 7 the Texas Supreme Court
also found the requirement unnecessarily burdensome 58 and reversed the
prior decision:
While an owner owes a duty to employees of an independent contractor to take reasonable precautions to protect them from hidden
dangers on the premises or to warn them thereof, an adequate warning
to or full knowledge by the independent contractor of the dangers
should and will be held to discharge the landowner's alternative duty
to warn the employees. 59
The Taylor opinion reflects a more pragmatic approach to premises liability. There is, however, an inherent defect in that the adopted rule is replete with opportunity for litigation: What is adequate warning or full
knowledge?
An indemnity agreement obtained from the contractor covering injuries
received by his employees would appear to be the solution to the owner's
dilemma. Contracts of absolute indemnity are not in violation of public
policy; 60 both the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit have upheld such agreements. 61 Unfortunately, attempts to
54. Galveston-Houston Elec. Ry. v. Reinle, 113 Tex. 456, 258 S.W. 803 (1924).
55. See Tyler v. McDaniel, 386 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Turner v. West Texas Util. Co., 290 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1961); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960).
57. 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
58. Id. at 393.
59. Id. at 394.
60. As announced in Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Sup.
1963): "In this state, contracts written or construed so as to allow indemnity for liability arising out of the indemnitee's own negligence have long been held not to be
violative of the public policy."
61. The cases in which the Supreme Court of Texas has enforced total indemnity
contracts include: Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Sup. 1963) ("all
claims and damages of every kind. . . arising out of or attributed directly or indirectly
to the operations of the contractor hereunder"); Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Diamond Press
Brick Co., 111 Tex. 18, 22, 222 S.W. 204, 205 (1920) ("harmless from any and
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hold the contractor to such liability is no simple matter. The most recent
supreme court case which deals with indemnity provisions, City of Beaus
mont v. Graham, 2 reveals the use of very strict rules of construction. Justice Hamilton, dissenting, read one of two applicable clauses broadly enough
to require the contractor to indemnify the city for "the cost of any lawsuit
' '63
. .. irrespective of causation, if it arises out of contractual activities.
The majority, on the other hand, found both provisions applicable only to
acts or conduct of the contractor:
The [first] provision . . . expressly stipulates that indemnity is to be
against claims for injuries or damages sustained "on account of any
negligent act or fault of CONTRACTOR . . .", and that contractor
will be required to pay any judgment obtained against city "growing
out of such injury or damage." The [second] provision . . . [though]
broader . . . nevertheless limits the contractor's indemnification obligation to claims and damages "arising out of his acts in connection
with the construction of the said improvements,
'6 4 or occasioned by said

contractor,his agents, servants, or employees.
The Graham decision presents significant difficulty in prospective drafting
of indemnity provisions. Proper sentence structure does support the majority position. The two provisions relating to negligence of the contractor,
however, appear to be surplusage. Furthermore, as Justice Hamilton noted,
all claims for damages arising from any cause whatsoever growing out of the construction, maintenance, and operation of said spur track."). In Mitchell's Inc. v. Friedman,
157 Tex. 424, 430-31, 303 S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957), the court also upheld an indemnity
provision:
An obligation to hold harmless from claims, liability or damage resulting from a
specified operation or instrumentality will be enforced in accordance with its terms
even though the indemnitee may thereby be relieved of the consequences of his
own negligence.
A representative case from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wherein an
indemnity agreement was approved is Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp.,
316 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1963) ("from any and all liability . . . resulting from
injuries ... while contractor is performing the work, which arises out of or in connection with the activities of contractor, contractor's servants, agents and employees.")
62. 441 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
63. Id. at 841.
64. Id. at 838 (court's emphasis). The contractual provisions in question were:
The CONTRACTOR and his Sureties shall indemnify and save harmless the
OWNER and all its officers, agents, and employees from all suits, actions or
claims of any character, name and description brought for or on account of any
injuries or damages received or sustained by any person or persons or property, on
account of any negligent act or fault of the CONTRACTOR, his agents or employees, in the execution of said contract; . . .will be required to pay any judgment,
with costs, which may be obtained against the OWNER growing out of such injury
or damage.
The CONTRACTOR agrees to fully indemnify and save the City whole and
harmless from all costs, expenses and damages arising out of any real or asserted
cause of action, and from any and all costs arising from wrong, injury, or damage
that may be occasioned to any person or property or to his employees, arising out
of his acts in connection with the construction of the said improvements, or occasioned by said CONTRACTOR, his agents, servants or employees.
Id. at 837-38.
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the language used in the Graham contract does not differ distinctly from
that which has been approved in prior cases. A conclusion of form over
substance may well be warranted. It should be recognized that even specific language may not withstand the test of construction. Thus, enforcement may be expected only where the contractual language offers no other
intention. Perhaps the safest approach would be an allocation of a portion
of the total contract price to reflect the extra burden being assumed by the
contractor. Specific language, of course, should be emphatically used if the
owner elects this approach to resolve questions concerning prospective liability.
The predicament of incurring liability for injury to repairmen becomes
acute when the totality of the danger is not known or has not been fully
ascertained by the performance of the requisite inspection. It would seem
illogical to expect the landowner to warn the specially skilled person he has
employed to repair the dangerous condition.
The old master-servant rule quite emphatically denied recovery to the
employees for injuries caused by defects which he had been hired to repair.
In City of Teague v. Radford,65 the court, in determining that the employee
had assumed the risk and denying recovery, stated:
It is the settled law that an employee or servant cannot recover for
damages or injuries which arise from defects in a thing, for the safe
condition of which such employee is himself responsible. This rule applies with the same force to a case where the employee undertakes,
with the master, to see to the safety of the premises .... 66
A distinction to the Radford rule was subsequently drawn in Wood v. Kane
Boiler Works, Inc.6 7 The plaintiff's decedent in Wood, an employee of a
subcontractor, had been hired as an inspector of the welding of a gas pipe
line being fabricated for the premises owner by the respondent. The decedent had ordered a defect in the pipe to be chipped out and rewelded.
After approving the rewelding, Wood initiated a hydrostatic test on the pipe.
Before completion of the test, however, the pipe burst and Wood was killed
by the escaping pressurized water.
The defendants sought to avoid liability for Wood's death by asserting
assumption of the risk and that there was "no duty" owed since the decedent had been employed to see that the pipe passed the hydrostatic test.
The court responded that the doctrine of assumed risk applied only to master-servant relationships 68 and, therefore, was not available since the injured
65. 63 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
66. Id. at 377.
67. 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951).
68. This curious holding of the court in Wood is responsible for the irreconcilable
distinction which Texas courts have made between the doctrines of assumption of risk
and volenti non fit injuria. Id. at 195, 238 S.W.2d at 176. This anomaly of Texas
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party was not an employee of the defendant. More significant, however,
was the finding that recovery for Wood's death was not barred because he
was not employed to repair defects in the pipe.69 The court thus restricted
the application of the doctrine of assumed risk to those instances in which
the employee is specifically employed to remedy the injuring defect. A
stringent drawing of the lines of liability and duty around the specific defect which a repairman has been employed to repair is a questionable approach to the problem of premises liability. Several jurisdictions have opted
in favor of an exception to the safe place requirement in which the owner
is under no duty to protect employees from risks arising from or intimately
connected with defects of the premises. 70 This recognition stems from a
decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Hammond v. City of El Dorado
Springs,7 in which the city was absolved from liability for injuries received
by the employee of an independent contractor who contracted to repair
the city's water storage tank. Closely parallel to the reasoning in the Radford master-servant rule, the Missouri court found that the employee could
not recover for injuries arising from defects which the contractor has under72
taken to repair.
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Texas was presented with an opportunity
to adopt the exception announced in the Missouri decision. In City of Beaumont v. Graham,78 the factual considerations were substantially identical:
injuries were sustained by employees of independent contractors while making repairs on water storage tanks owned by the cities. Yet, the Texas Supreme Court managed to distinguish the Hammond decision, finding that
the contract presented to the Missouri court was one calling for a general
repair.7 4 Thus, Graham was decided in full agreement with Wood v. Kane
Boiler Works, Inc., 75 where the plaintiff's injuries resulted from defects which
the contractor had not been employed to repair.
Whether the exception announced in Hammond v. City of El Dorado
Springs76 will prospectively apply in Texas is not adequately answered in
the Graham opinion. In response to the City of Beaumont's assertion that
Hammond should control the factual considerations in Graham, the court
stated:
This court recognized the exception to an owner's or occupier's duty to
an invitee and discussed it at some length in Wood v. Kane Boiler
law was recently abolished in Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tex.
Sup. 1972).
69. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 198, 238 S.W.2d 172, 176 (1951).
70. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1375, 1385 (1951).
71. 242 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1951); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1367 (1951).
72. Hammond v. City of Eldorado Springs, 242 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Mo. 1951).
73. 441 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
74. Id. at 835.
75. 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951).
76. 242 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1951).
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Works....
We also recognized that the rationale of the exception
rested upon the doctrine . "volenti non fit injuria" . . . . It is but
an extension to an employer-independent contractor relationship of the
applied in similar factual situations in masterdoctrine of assumed7risk
7
servant relationships.
The court's language would seem to support the application of the Hammond exception in future actions; however, in a subsequent portion of the
opinion, the court also stated:
Assuming that we would apply the exception . . . to risks only intimately connected with defects which the contractor has undertaken
to repair. . . that obviously was not what the jury found. The finding
is that the work being performed was intimately connected with the
work contracted to be performed. . . . 78The work being performed
. . . was expressly requiredby the contract.
It is most unfortunate that the court prefaced its subsequent remarks with
the word "assuming." On the one hand, the court indicates that the Hammond exception would apply under appropriate circumstances. Yet, the
word "assuming" creates doubtful prospective application of the exception
which it has supposedly "recognized." Does the Graham opinion reveal an
intention to apply the old master-servant rule to similar factual situations
which involve employers of independent contractors? Was the court recognizing a difficulty in ascertaining what constitutes "risks . . . intimately connected with defects"? Does the court indicate a desire to limit these "in-'
timately connected risks" to those which have been expressed in the contract between the parties? Or, would a contract for general repairs absolve
the landowner from all liability? The ambiguity in the opinion creates
substantial opportunities for litigation.
Slip and FallInjuries Sustained in Public Business Establishments
The Texas cases clearly establish that the "no duty" doctrine applies where
the defendant has given an adequate warning of a dangerous conditionthe warning discharges the owner's duty to the invitee. 79 There is "no duty,"
furthermore, to warn of open and obvious conditions8 0 as the invitee will
be held to have assumed the risk when he proceeds in the face of known
and appreciated dangers.8 ' From the owner's vantage point, the rules are
logical and fairly effective; however, they have operated in an inequitable
manner in the slip and fall cases.
In Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell,82 the plaintiff was injured when
77. City of Beaumont v. Graham, 441 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex. Sup. 1969) (emphasis
added).
78. Id. at 835 (court's emphasis).
79. E.g., Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
80. Harvey v. Scale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Tex. Sup. 1962).

81. See Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 468, 226 S.W.2d 425, 433 (1950).
82. 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Sup. 1963).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss4/7

14

Patton: The Texas Rule of Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land for I

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:800

he slipped and fell on a recently mopped floor. 'The judgment of the lower
court, based on a jury finding that the plaintiff was not negligent in failing
to heed a warning given by the appellant's employee, was found to be erroneous. 83 The rule of premises liability is clearly a discharge of duty in
those instances of adequate warning to the invitee! An analysis of the facts,
however, reveals significant questions: (1) the company had always roped
off the freshly mopped areas in the past; (2) the film on the floor was difficult to see; (3) the evidence was contradictory on whether a warning
had been given; and (4) according to the employee's own testimony, he
was leading the customer to obtain a particular item of merchandise when
the slip and fall occurred.8 4 Considering the totality of these circumstances,
it would indeed be difficult to find that one had assumed the risk, but this
case was decided on the "no duty" doctrine.8 5 In other words, in spite of
the fact that the customer was following the defendant's salesman when
the injury occurred, the mere fact of a warning negated any further duty
to the invitee. The important question is whether any reasonable man
would not have followed the salesman. However, the rule of law is clear.
The Supreme Court of Texas had no choice but to reverse and render for
the defendant-company. 8 6 But is the result fair?
Assumption of risk has been widely criticized as a harsh doctrine. The
fact that the doctrine has functioned as an inequitable instrument of law
is well demonstrated in Houston National Bank v. Adair.87

The plaintiff's

wife, a regular customer of the bank, was injured when she slipped and fell
on stairs leading to the statement window in the basement. In affirming
the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for instructed verdict, on the grounds that "the condition of the stairs was open, visible and
obvious to any reasonably careful person,"88 the supreme court gave no consideration to negligence on the part of the bank. Thus, despite the fact
that the stairs were made of a white, smooth marble and had not been
"altered, rebuilt or repaired" 89 after 20 years of use, and the failure of the
bank to provide a handrail except a balustrade which "was so wide that it
could not be grasped or gripped by a person's hand," 90 Mrs. Adair's recovery was barred because she had "voluntarily exposed herself to such risks as
existed." 9 '
The rules of "no duty" and assumption of the risk may be logical in the83. Id.

84. Id. at 737.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
146 Tex. 387, 207 S.W.2d 374 (1948).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 375.

90. Id.at 375.
91. Id. at 376.
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ory, but the consequences are repugnant to the basic concept of negligence
-the existence of fault. The essential question should be: Who was more
at fault in either the Campbell or Adair cases? The predicates of premises
liability impose a duty on the landowner to provide a safe place for the
invitee. Yet Western Auto and the Houston National Bank both failed to
meet this primary responsibility. Are we obtaining the ends which the law
of premises liability is designed to foster? To the contrary, the application of premises liability law has provided an escape to the landowner's
liability for failure to repair defective conditions on a premises which is
held open, and supposedly safe, to the public. The Texas rule of premises
liability has provided, by judicial fiat, a licensing of defective conditions.
A more reasonable approach should be sought to deal with the demands of
this society.
-THE SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE CRITERION

Texas precedent reveals a limited, yet continuing, thread of reference to
superior knowledge as the true basis of liability in defective premises actions. If the determination of liability were based upon a test of ascertaining which party was most able to avoid the resulting injury, i.e., who was more
at fault, more equitable results would necessarily follow. The most recent
expression of superior knowledge as a determinative factor occurs in Shell
Chemical Co. v. Lamb,9 2 where the supreme court denied recovery against
a landowner because the employee's independent contractor was in a "superior position to prevent the existence of, to inspect for, and to eliminate or
warn its employees of this dangerous condition." 9 3
The recognition of superior knowledge as a criterion in determining liability for injuries sustained by invitees stems from the case of Worth Food
Markets, Inc. v. LeBaume,94 where the court, in absolving the store owner
from liability, stated:
The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of a
perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon
the property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the
owner, or the occupant, and not known to the person injured, that a
recovery is permitted. 95
The rule was also applied in Hall v. Medical Building,"6 where a door dangerously opened into that portion of the lobby of the building where business
invitees necessarily waited for elevators. The plaintiff, although aware of
92. 493 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Sup. 1973).
93. Id. at 748 (emphasis added). Superior knowledge was also considered in Western Auto Sitply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1964), but the case
was decided on discharge of duty by adequate warning.
94. 112 S.W.2d 1089 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1938, writ dism'd).
95. Id. at 1091 (quoted source omitted).
96. 151 Tex. 425, 151 S.W.2d 497 (1952).
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the door, was without knowledge that the condition presented potential
peril. Recovery was allowed because "the evidence . . . tend[ed] to prove

that the proprietor's knowledge of the danger was superior to that of the
'97
petitioner.
The difficulty in transposing the Hall and LeBaume cases into controlling
principles is found in the absence of knowledge of the dangerous condition
by one party. Thus, the criterion applied was not really "superior knowledge" but one in which there was an absence of knowledge by one party.
The Lamb case, on the other hand, did apply a form of "superior knowledge" in determining liability upon a finding of "superior position" to avoid
the consequences of the danger.
A true test of "superior knowledge" should consider the relative negligence
of the parties. The opportunity to decide premises liability questions upon
the strict principles of negligence and contributory negligence has been presented to the supreme court, 98 and a few cases have been decided on that

basis. 0 The principle of stare decisis, however, has convinced the court to
continue to apply the "no duty" and volenti doctrines where applicable. 10 0
Further criticism of the court's choice is not necessary, 10 1 but an opportunity to reconsider this decision is afforded by the adoption of the new comparative negligence statute. The new statute does not abolish the common

law doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, however,
application of the latter doctrine is restricted to a function of apportioning
damages except where the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than that
of the defendant.' 0 2 Similar application of the doctrine of assumed
97. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
98. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
99. Id. at 377. See Triangle Motors v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60
(1953); Blanks v. Southland Hotel, Inc., 149 Tex. 139, 229 S.W.2d 357 (1950); United
Gas Corp. v. Crawford, 141 Tex. 332, 172 S.W.2d 297 (1943); Walgreen-Texas Co. v.
Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941); McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex.
314, 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941); J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Brockman, 135 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1940, jdgmt adopted); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Gascamp, 69 Tex. 545, 7
S.W.227 (1888).
100. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. Sup. 1963);
see Greenhill, Assumption of the Risk, 28 TEX. B.J. 21 (1965).
101. For a recent scholarly consideration see Edgar, Voluntasry Assumption of Risk
in Texas Revisited-A Plea For Its Abolition, 26 Sw. L.J. 849 (1972). See Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961). For a general
discussion of the Texas rule of assumption of risk, see Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20
Sw. L.J. 1 (1966).
102. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. (1974) states in part:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
party or the legal representative of any person or party to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to persons or property if such negligence is
not greater than the negligence of the person or party or persons or parties against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proporlon to the amount of negligence attributed to the person or party recovering.
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risk would appear in concert with the ultimate consideration of apportioning
liability according to the relative fault of the parties.' 03
CONCLUSION

Whether the supreme court will respond to the legislative mandate to apportion damages by restricting the effect of the judicially created doctrine
of assumption of risk remains a question of prospective import. A criterion of superior knowledge of dangerous conditions on the premises would
not only function well in apportioning damages, but would also suffice as

precedent for the much needed revision of the Texas rule of premises liability.
The foregoing cursory reconsideration of the application of the Texas rule
of premises liability hopefully has revealed the more glaring inadequacies of
the present approach. In retrospect, it seems very difficult to favorably advise one's client without accompanying warnings of potentially adverse rulings by the appellate courts. The prospect of pretrial settlement is at least
made more difficult by the intricate detail which has been promulgated by
the supreme court in its review of premises liability. Reason dictates that a
manageable solution is needed to avoid the opportunity for protracted litigation. The Supreme Court of Texas should, at its earliest opportunity, revisit,
reconsider and redefine the precepts of premises liability to meet contemporary needs.
103. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has abolished assumption of the risk in certain instances, e.g., McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis.
1962) (host to guest in automobile); Colson v. Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1962)
(employer to employee on farm). More importantly, however, in a case in which it
appeared that "greater fairness" would result if conduct were "couched in terms of contributory negligence rather than in terms of assumption of risk," the court found no
reason to abolish assumption of risk. Gilson v. Drees Bros., 120 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis.
1963). Although the conduct in question would clearly fall into the dictates of assumption of risk, the court sought to assign liability according to the negligence of
the parties. Id. at 67. In other words, the court treated assumption of risk as negligent conduct.
Justice Greenhill has parenthetically noted the possibility of treating assumption of
risk as a matter of fault. See Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 28 TEx. B.J. 21, 22
(1965).
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